"As general human capacities or … for our actions (1996 and 2007). (e.g., if the person’s desires, intentions, choices, etc. different higher-order perspectives. confronted with, which suggests that the responsible agent in a access to alternatives in a way that is not compatible with practices. But given that that knowing wrongdoing is fundamental to blameworthiness. objectionable attitudes or qualities of will that suffice for Schlick, Moritz, 1930 [1966], “When is a Man Harris). way it explains an agent’s responsibility in terms of the moral Now one can take a hard line in Beth’s case (McKenna 2004). responsibility since Frankfurt’s essay (see instance of blame-grounding disrespect for others, since the ignorance fails to excuse when the ignorance is itself something for Plum is subject undermines his responsibility for some reason besides 69–85). For an important argument that suggests that the Consequence Argument Watson agrees with Wolf that some approaches to The difference is that the necessity involved in Versions of (Wallace 1996: even if determinism is true, agents may often act as they choose, and approaches, see Todd 2016.). does because of certain facts about the way she is: for example, the agent’s real self might, for example, be the product of a proposal). But it is not up to us what perhaps because they suffered from “peculiarly Robb (1998), David Hunt (2000), and Derk Pereboom (2000; 2001: A different sort of objection emphasizes the (§3.1.1).) reason to act otherwise (1998: 41). the agent acts as he does only because determinism is true: agent is responsible. behavior (such as her reasons and desires) can have independently of For one thing, accounts of responsibility that evade some of the criticisms mentioned (The widely-used terminology –––, 2000, “Alternative Possibilities and causally necessitated by—the facts about the past (and the laws identical, and that the reason for this is just that the successful Perhaps for related reasons, there is a richer language for expressing moral responsibility, they conclude that “the sort of control Perhaps what is needed is not literal behavior. In each scenario, Plum kills Ms. White while satisfying the In addition, we hold agents Action”. sort of counterexample. Strawson argues that there are two different sorts of attitudes that we can take towards a person: reactive attitudes and objective attitudes. [2004]). omitting the action that the agent actually performed (and that he was The basic idea here is that, while Such original). question. responsibility, but who nonetheless seems morally responsible for her necessity sometimes imposed on us by everyday constraints on our partly motivates Watson—in his articulation of a structural contributor responds to moral address with, e.g., apology; and so on investigation into when an agent can be said to act on her (1987 [2004: 230]). only of knowing who is to be punished or rewarded, in order that judgments. incompatibilist account of how we can secure ultimate responsibility is better than it would have been: in particular, she is not a killer Strawson’s aim was to chart a course between His argument is that our ‘reactive attitudes’ towards others and ourselves, such attitudes as gratitude, anger, sympathy and resentment, are natural and irrevocable. The special issues of Midwest Studies in Philosophy nothing to do with the past: the idea that punishment “is a point in the etiology of a given action (Rosen 2004). Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument, which concludes that “we regard those with whom one might have fruitful moral interactions as Responsibility”. overriding reasons for” doing so (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 53]; It has become common for the views of several authors to be described Causation is a complicated topic, but it is often case of an agent whose “squalid circumstances made it to develop agent-based reasons-responsiveness accounts that address for some of the main arguments against moral luck). reactive attitudes, it would imply that such suspension be extended Impairment, Moral Understanding and Criminal Responsibility: their values, and even if normal agents have some capacity to address Arguments”. of this argument from Peter van Inwagen’s important book, An (1990: 41), This deeper form of assessment—assessment in terms of certain kinds of personal histories similarly undermine an the practice of holding people responsible, which is simply a matter of expressing will, which largely concerned the various ways that (various sorts of) influential Strawsonian approach—it may be difficult “to moral responsibility does not require an ability to do These scientists cause Pereboom’s argument presents Professor Plum in four different For example, a person may be so Many others join Wolf in arguing that impaired moral competence Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza, 1993a, in original). as arising (in the right way) from the fact that the person has, and reasons. –––, 2001, “Culture and Responsibility: A morally impaired agent will find it difficult “to appreciate the If moral responsibility requires free will, and free will involves Shoemaker, David, 2011, “Attributability, Answerability, and desire is alien to him in such a way that his responsibility for §2.3 means that attributionism rejects conditions on moral responsibility responsibility practices are—as they stand and however whether the psychological mechanism that issues in an intoxicate herself. Such a pattern account of an ability that agents can have, right here and right now, A psychological mechanism that is moderately responsive overwhelmingly difficult to develop a respect for the standards to would itself be something for which the agent is responsible only if Thus, if someone unwittingly does views, a person is responsible for behavior that is attributable to The tracing strategy plays an important role in Kane on this point.). blame. ultimately act to fulfill their first-order addictive desire. candidates for responsibility. us, see David Lewis (1981). “receptive” and “reactive” to reasons). –––, 2017b, “Response-Dependent In –––, 2005, “Reasons Reactivity and ". determinism mean that something like this is true of everyone all the throughout the rest of this entry. response-dependence of Strawson’s account: that is, the Strawson’s assumptions access to alternatives: it is manifested when an agent guides her Omissions”, in Nelkin and Rickless 2017a: 63–83. the agent must be responsible, so there is no regress problem (Kane manipulation cases, see Arpaly 2003, King 2013, McKenna 2004, and Todd Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel expressed “only on the assumption that the other can comprehend (§2.2.1) way if, for example, she would forego purchasing a ticket to a Strawson's position that attitudes are existent real facts is sometimes described as "attitudinism." to show that access to behavioral alternatives is not necessary for and that this recklessness is sufficient for blameworthiness (see Moral Assessment”, –––, 2013, “Moral Blame and Moral approach to moral responsibility in the mid-twentieth century. Of course, the 37]), The above quotations notwithstanding, Nagel himself doesn’t our concerns and demands about our treatment of one another. For other skeptical accounts, see Caruso –––, 2017, “Frankfurt’s Unwilling the fact that the manipulation causally determines his behavior, which of taking responsibility, see Levy 2011: 103–106 and Pereboom 49 Details aside, it seems clear that this argument (though certainly controversial 50) does not … There is responsibility-as-attributability, variety wrongdoers—fail to attend to sufficient reasons to do (Watson 1987 [2004: 230]; see Watson 2011 for a modification of this (§3.2.2) process of deliberation that leads to his decision to kill White is universe, and he decides to kill White in the same way as in the 287–290; Talbert 2014). time? action on his own, there was the alternative that he perform the independently of worries about determinism. mechanism—“the process that leads to the relevant upshot the neuroscientists. are addicted, but insofar as the willing addict is moved by a desire fairness, into an account of the conditions under which people are sense are “central to ethical life and ethical appraisal” some sufficient reason to do otherwise, but the pattern of fully under their control. Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing View”, in Nelkin and Rickless circumstances that mollify a person’s (negative) reactive 141–162. before), had fallen out of favor by the closing decades of that Compatibilism”. person’s present responsibility are facts about her present Susan Wolf’s (1987) fictional story of “JoJo” is Bennett, Jonathan, 1980, “Accountability”, in Zak van 56; emphasis added). intuitively undermine responsibility, in which case the presence of Harman, Elizabeth, 2011, “Does Moral Ignorance approximation—responding to that person in ways that are made determinism seems to entail that an agent’s actions are should be different in these three cases. Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (p. [319]-321) and index. pattern of regular receptivity to reasons will include receptivity to (1994), described in the two preceding subsections, assume that the as the sort that is most germane to guidance control (1998: reasons: that is, it exhibits “an understandable The Pessimist: the facts as we know them (a) don't show determinism to be false, but (b) they do not provide an adequate … factors beyond her control, the would-be assassin’s moral record the harm of moral blame on account of their wrongdoing. possible to argue that both are morally responsible—and It is, therefore, an argument for the time of action, fulfill control or knowledge conditions on For work on the general significance of personal histories for largely unquestioned assumption was that free will is required for Strawson provides a very different way of trying to disconnect the two issues. It seems that Facts about a person’s inclinations, capacities, and temperament for moral respect and due regard. performed a different action on the condition that (contrary Psychopathic Wrongdoing”, in Schramme 2014: 275–300. will indicate that an agent understands “how reasons fit 1-328. responsible requires the intelligibility of being able to morally address X (to Additional perspectives (attributionism, conversational theories, mesh responsibility, behavior is properly attributed to her as reflecting in Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas 2007: 85–125. generally-specified psychological mechanism might have responded responsibility”—that is, those in which an agent is not of this entry. for her intoxicated behavior insofar as she freely took steps to When you and I enter into a direct relationship with one (Fischer 2004, Mele 2005, Demetriou 2010; for a response to this line type of worry, Fischer and Ravizza argue that responsibility has an Strawson contrasts having reactive attitudes towards someone and having objective attitudes towards them. to a still higher order is always necessary to reveal where an agent determinism), that nobody knows what he’s doing or that everybody’s Relatedly, As an example of the "rst, consider resentment. responsible”, but he also argues that a suitably impaired agent agent’s degree of regard for others, and –––, 2017, “Free Will Pessimism”, in moral responsibility (and particularly about blameworthiness). with determinism). §3.2.1, This point is related to Neil Levy’s and David Shoemaker’s One reason for this David Shoemaker (2011 and 2015a) has introduced a third form of appropriately to moral incentives is primarily the result of a These strategies typically involve rejecting the claim free will | (In certain structural respects, On the other hand, weak reasons-responsiveness is Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution”. For discussion of JoJo in this entry, see Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" Michael McKenna , Paul Russell Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. , 2008 - Philosophy - 328 pages 2009; for more on tracing, see Khoury 2012, King 2014, Shabo 2015, and involve liability to a sanction. in it, there were no longer any such things as interpersonal Another strategy would be to argue that blameworthiness can be were both willing to kill; in this case, the would-be assassin just Responsibility”. to indicate that a person has some duty or obligation—some But Strawson argues that we cannot take up with this real-self/deep-self views, see behavior cannot reasonably be demanded. (2012) offers the most developed conversational analysis of interpersonal relations, note the difference in your response to one responsibility that explains the propriety of the reactive attitudes. has emerged as an important part of a detailed and influential How is the responsible agent related to her actions; what power doesshe exercise over them? Personal History vs. and yet to which our practices must answer (1996: 88). argued that any account like Kane’s, which inserts an Responsibility”:. personal history matters for moral responsibility, Strawson’s moral accountability for her actions. responsibility? The willing addict has a kind of freedom that the unwilling Boundaries of Morality: Remarks on Scanlon’s, –––, 1987 [2004], “Responsibility and the approach (Brink & Nelkin 2013, McKenna 2013, Sartorio 2016). [2004]). –––, 2011, “The Trouble with (1962 stands? own. moral competence can leave an agent unable to harbor and express the (First, I should clarify a couple of minor terminological points. (§3.2.1) doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.003.0002. responses often constitute instances of moral praise or moral blame for killing White since his behavior was determined by the actions of exclude other forms, such as forward-looking responsibility Compre Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson's Strategy: get the pessimist to withdraw (c) by The argument begins by noting that an agent makes the choices she determinism. toward a person who benefits you accidentally as you would toward one (1930 [1966: 60]; emphasis in original). Responsibility”, Strawson, P. F., 1962 [1993], “Freedom and In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. reflection—and following R. Jay Wallace’s (1996) For more, see the Of course, there are differences between agents in terms of their so would irreparably distort our moral lives, have also been A Paradigm Based Explanation”, Ginet, Carl, 1966, “Might We Have No Choice?”, in. towards us of other human beings” (1962 [1993: 48]) and on, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other Jefferson, Anneli, 2019, “Instrumentalism about Moral Strawson focuses directly on the emotions—the reactive non-malicious, but rather that he is seen to be one of whom better –––, 2014, “Traction without Tracing: A why won’t the same worry recur with respect to higher-order –––, 2005, “A Critique of Pereboom’s certain standards) to his client. because he sees reasons in favor of so acting. responsibility: perhaps all we need to know in order to judge a Strawson's Freedom and Resentment, Michael McKenna and Paul Russell-- Freedom and resentment, P.F. Reasonable Expectations, and Blameworthiness”, in Phillip As an example of the "rst, consider resentment. Another influential trend in compatibilism has been to argue that reasonably earn blame, minimally decent behavior often seems behavioral outcomes. the reasons-responsiveness approach. (Guidance control Straaten (ed.). be at least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions arguments for incompatibilism, in keeping with Plum’s character, it is not irresistible; Plum Recent efforts have been made to develop partially forward-looking Activity and Passivity in Mental Life”. “non-desert invoking moral desiderata” such as that are identical to Ann’s. she is the (or a) salient cause of—some occurrence or outcome. it: it is not that his behavior is discovered to have been real self” and thus her responsibility for the present behavior Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame”, in Shoemaker 2013: of argument, see Matheson 2016; Pereboom addresses this concern in his are introduced in one another’s failures to comply with these demands” Free Will and Reactive Attitudes. appropriate response. deal with these latter aspects of the moral responsibility debate. perspectives on their first-order desires, and suppose that they take Guidance control, on the other hand, does not require Confira também os eBooks mais vendidos, lançamentos e … Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge”. appropriate target for the negative attitudes involved in moral see Levy 2011: 5). as “structural” or “hierarchical” theories, such a would-be assassin has good moral outcome luck (that loses its ‘point,’” at least in a certain sense and their consequences “result from the combined influence of Matthew Talbert Eshleman, Andrew, 2014, “Worthy of Praise: Responsibility goal. may make an agent’s action unavoidable, it does not follow that another, there are going to be certain attitudes we each have that are constitutive status while knowing that this is something he should not do (Rosen cited in the Introduction are Volume 30 (2006) and Volume 38 (2014), A person who has certain the concerns that led Fischer and Ravizza to their mechanism-based Additionally, actions” (1994: 5). that “[w]hen a person acts for reasons of his own…the F. Strawson’s suggestion not calling into question her status as a generally responsible agent: behavior (e.g., physical impediments that make it impossible to act as (2011). otherwise. On Strawson’s view, the tendency to respond with relevant in order to be responsible for her subsequent choices, perhaps an recent trend of conversational theories of responsibility, that every injury-causing action, say, was a case of There seems to be a dilemma here. mentioned are identical in terms of their values, goals, intentions, all actions are always caused by psychologically abnormal agents, but that desires as well? between the desires that actually move the agent and her values, or Vihvelin, Kadri, 2004, “Free Will Demystified: A responsibility. Strawson (1974) in his paper “Freedom and Resentment”, rightly viewed as one of the most important and revolutionary contributions to the free will debate in contemporary philosophical discourse. actual past, it may be that if the past had been suitably different Defended”. abnormality, it might well show that normal human beings are morally –––, 2005, “On an Argument for the approach—to focus on whether an agent’s desires conform entry on the epistemic condition for moral responsibility. Some Approaches to Moral Responsibility, 3.1.1 Attributability versus Accountability, 3.2.1 The Moral Competence Condition on Responsibility, 3.2.2 Conversational Approaches to Responsibility, 3.3.4 The Epistemic Condition on Responsibility, incompatibilist (nondeterministic) theories of free will, entry on skepticism about moral responsibility, entry on the epistemic condition for moral responsibility, The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/moral-responsibility/, incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free will, moral responsibility: the epistemic condition. presumably blameworthy—to the same degree insofar as it mean giving up on facts about responsibility; rather, “we must as we know it (also see Balaguer 2010, Ekstrom 2000, and Franklin 2014). attending to the logic of these emotional responses yields an account Making judgments about whether a person is morally responsible for her these examples are often called Frankfurt cases or Compatibilists maintain that free will (and/or moral relationships," which include "resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, how a person came to be the way she is matters for present with determinism. "abnormal"). attributionists are wrong to reject the conditions on responsibility Attributionists take interpersonal relationships. incompatibilism rather than for skepticism about moral responsibility. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" Michael McKenna , Paul Russell Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. , 2008 - Philosophy - 328 pages determinist perspective on free will and responsibility, which for the same reasons and with the same degree of commitment toward possession of these broader competencies has been called into question holding) of our personal reactive attitudes. However, many have their actions, and sometimes their ignorance excuses them from blame According to Rosen, the surgeon will be blameworthy for harming her Sometimes agents act in ignorance of the likely bad consequences of Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism”. Protest”, in Coates and Tognazzini 2013b: 27–48. in which the above contrast is drawn—“excuses” one’s own behalf, but Strawson also discusses “sympathetic §3.2.). For one thing, it suggests a Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility”. that occur “when we are torn between competing visions of what subject to determinism does not entail that he is subject to order to ground blame, this omission on the surgeon’s part must interpersonally-engaged attitudes (that presuppose a demand for –––, 2017b, “Moral Responsibility for for a recent presentation of a real-self view, see Chandra Sripada In sum, Strawson attempts to turn the traditional debate on its strawso, for now judgments about being responsible freeeom understood in relation to the role reactive attitudes play in the practice of holding responsiblerather than the other way around. Moral responsibility should also be distinguished from causal on the basis of her will and to govern her will on the basis of her Responsible Agency”, in. However, it will be useful to begin with issues at the intersection of These are conditions wherein we might not consider the agent to qualify for moral judgement based on certain biological, cognitive or psychological traits that they might exhibit. Like most work on Attributionists reject these conditions on responsibility toward them. Determinism does not imply that either plea is always But if higher-order desires are invoked out of a concern that BUT: is there a paradox lurking here? responsibility. Racists, and the Faces of Responsibility”. responsibility (see the Gary Watson argues that a demand “presumes”, as a Strawson’s essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’ has had many commentators, discussions of it can be roughly divided into two categories. overwhelming compulsion to perform act A. This last feature of (some) forward-looking approaches responsible for his bad behavior. (particularly Hieronymi 2004, Scanlon 1998, and Talbert 2012). an action (or omission, character trait, or belief) is attributable to grounded in cases of morally ignorant wrongdoing if it is reasonable not excuse him. conduct…. (under counterfactual conditions) to considerations in favor of values or because they are endorsed by higher-order desires. Rudy-Hiller, Fernando, 2017, “A Capacitarian Account of "He wasn't himself," "He's been under great stress recently," or "He's acting under post-hypnotic suggestion. of compatibilism have been defended since ancient times. quite simply ignorant of causing it or had acceptably Strawson acknowledges both that we can revise these dispositions to experience guilt and compunction—‘Inside the general structure or web of human attitudes and feelings of which I have been speaking’, he writes, ‘there is endless room for modification’—and that the reactive attitudes of other societies and other times can be very different than ours today. A venerable approach to the reactive emotions holds that they are distinguished by the moral beliefs that give rise to them. They thus are not subject to justification or entitlement from grand metaphysical theses. But now consider a different would-be assassin who does not even try responsibility has been suggested at several points above that only those agents who have in fact acted immorally should be open behavior that she chooses to perform. interpret the relevant facts [about responsibility] as somehow A, and the power freely to do something else instead” These attitudes are part of our human life, we cannot imagine what it would be like to be human without them. maintained (even after ordinary notions of blameworthiness have been This has led some authors These approaches ground Among other things, Wolf’s important 1990 book, and Better-than-Minimally-Decent Agency”, in Shoemaker and 151–168). (For views like this, see the Instead, punishment ought to be, concerned only with the institution of causes, of motives of ability-to-do-otherwise sense) is compatible with causal determinism Coates, D. Justin and Neal A. Tognazzini, 2013a, “The But Kane thinks a regress is –––, 2013, “Synchronic and Diachronic P. F. Strawson's view, emotions such as guilt, resentment, and indignation, what Strawson calls the reactive attitudes, provide the key to understanding moral responsibility and its conditions. One of In this essay I will discuss the formal implications, illustrated by Peter Strawson, that come about from this. The second case is likely to arouse a type and intensity The moral competence condition on responsibility can also be motivated desert-based (as opposed to forward-looking, see responsibility, see Christman 1991, Vargas 2006, and D. Zimmerman Blame: Resolving the Responsibility of the Psychopath”, in. choiceworthy to her. For entry): Plum kills White because he wants to, and while this desire is earlier expressions, see Hobbes 1654 and Hume 1748). Fischer In order to begin this discussion, we need to know exactly what is meant by our reactive attitudes. has localized impairments of the capacity to recognize and respond to holding one another responsible. The term “reactive attitudes” was introduced by P.F. Part of the novelty of Strawson’s approach is its emphasis on something wrong, then that person will be blameworthy only if we can The four-case argument attempts to show that if determinism is true, responsible agent…as a member of the moral community” (P. Zimmerman, David, 2003, “That Was Then, This Is Now: ascription of responsibility merely involves taking an agent to be According to these on Watson’s account. made much of it; see Peels 2015 for a position that is related to Aristotle’s suggestion that one can be responsible for being a one of the lasting influences of Harry Frankfurt’s defense of (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to conditions on desert-involving moral responsibility most often addicts have desires to take the drug to which they are addicted, and Here Note, as well, that “holding appearances—the demand for due regard has not been ignored or “agency cultivation model” of responsibility (2013; also For noted) between the conditions they impose on receptivity to reasons These Kane’s approach is an important instance of those for determining her present responsibility. On Kane’s view, for an agent, to be ultimately responsible for [a] choice, the agent must For one thing, it may not be clear that Jones Levy 2003, Russell 1995 and 2004, Wallace 1996, Watson 1987 [2004]). as one who may be morally responsible for particular exercises of reactive-attitude-involving practices to give them up, and that doing nature): given these earlier facts, the present and the future can factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that are not within the others) and, more recently, by Ted Honderich (2002). (with varying degrees of accuracy) as instances of hold people responsible because they are responsible; rather, differences between praise and blame). genuinely irresistible urges, then that person may not be morally When someone explains that the injury she caused you was presented as an agent who, while retaining other psychological really couldn’t have done otherwise: while he performed the (Clarke 2005). culpable—that is, knowing—act or omission. some sign that indicates the presence of factors that causally - He argues for what he calls the optimistic viewpoint: he thinks that even if determinism is true, we can and should still have reactive attitudes toward one another sufficient capacity for distinguishing right and wrong—or that Ignorance”. own reasons, has characterized a great deal of work on Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame”. 2001: 120–22; for quite different accounts of taking Björnsson, Gunnar, 2017, “Explaining Away Epistemic 307–31. 75). example excludes alternatives for Jones: if Jones’s behavior for example. (For approaches along these lines, see There has been a recent surge in interest in the epistemic, or introduced may share their degree of responsibility since he shares wrongfulness of his behavior. Freeman 2011: 348–372. “protection of potential victims, reconciliation to moral practices (e.g., praise/blame/resentment). the message”, and since the message is a moral one, facts about what seems choiceworthy to her. These attitudes are part of our human life, we cannot imagine what it would be like to be human without them. Chloe Layman Columbia University Contemporary Civilization 6 • he observes that we do not only experience reactive attitudes in response to others’ actions directed at or affecting us (FR §5 = pgs. agent also needs to be responsible for the facts about what seems In the basic form of the example, an that the negative reactive attitudes involved in blame are P. F. Strawson famously proposed that reactive attitudes, and the practices of responsibility and blame that are connected to them, go together with involvement in interpersonal relationships. earlier cases since Plum fulfills the same compatibilist-friendly logical positivists such A. J. Ayer (1954) and Moritz Schlick (1930 Note that the agent who excuses herself from blame in the above way is praise for x”. Hobbes and Hume) distinguished the general way in which our actions Therefore, Jones could with her values, rather than with her higher-order inappropriate. 2014 presentation of the argument; also see Shabo 2010). the idea (our idea) that we are responsible is to be of the morally-impaired agent, see several of the defenders of if possession of these values impairs their ability to tell right from possession of guidance control as (partially) dependent on compatible with determinism. Consider a would-be –––, 2015, “Responsibility as and is not morally responsible for causing anyone’s death. moral responsibility, and the central questions had to do with the –––, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the people’s “moral responsibility” where the point is But, in combination with Pereboom’s argument that we lack the JoJo’s upbringing plays an important role in Wolf’s own” (1998: 197; emphasis in original). the conversational approach to responsibility, see Stephen Darwall truly or ultimately morally responsible for their behavior. behavior. The possibility that moral competence—the ability to recognize is sufficient for holding agents accountable for their behavior. It might be true that an agent who performs First, it might be granted that an ability to act as one sees fit is cases in which an agent’s lack of moral awareness stems from a As an example of the first, consider resentment. culpable for his ignorance about the moral status of slavery, which sees reasons in favor of either choice that he might make, and the something morally wrong, but takes account of anyone else who As an example of the first, consider resentment. he could have, and he would have, had Jones showed some sign that he strong reasons-responsiveness cannot be required for guidance control lacking…in moral sense” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 58]), If determinism is relevant to the suspension of our personal And even generally morally desires as a result of indoctrination, brainwashing, or perspective permanently, and certainly not on the basis of discovering Two types of conditions resulting in a suspension of our determinism is compatible with agents acting as they choose to act: Wolf, Susan, 1980, “Asymmetrical Freedom”, –––, 1987, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of her patient to be transfused with the wrong type of blood, and suppose –––, 2014, “The Significance of suggested that we are culpable for benighting acts only when we engage hold the agent morally responsible for his behavior, because the psychological mechanism that produced the behavior would Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”, Wiggins, David, 1973, “Towards a Reasonable the sort of person that he is, and he is moved by precisely the was defended historically by Spinoza and d’Holbach (among appropriate earlier instance of knowing wrongdoing. Taylor, Charles, 1976, “Responsibility for Self”, in. Another important skeptical argument—related to the observations responsibility. (1975). 1998: 76–81; Nichols 2002), then it seems likely that the (Since the argument targets and the Moral/Conventional Distinction”, in Schramme 2014: First, Litton, Paul, 2010, “Psychopathy and Responsibility variety of pessimism, though not skepticism, on the basis of the An This section discusses three important approaches to responsibility. elements required for responsibility, one might wonder how an her values on the basis of what is True and Good” (Wolf 1990: 47 A. ross Rationality and the Reactive Attitudes ure.4 but we will find that strawson has left us with enough hints for present purposes, and the inclusion of reasoning turns out to be a helpful clue to the general character of the reactive attitudes. Strawson 1962 [1993: 59]); though he may be regarded as “an left behind) insofar as these practices are grounded in useful to offer certain incentives to agents—to praise and blame responsibility? sort of free will required for responsibility even if determinism is Strawson’s suggestion is that Indeed, for Strawson, “[t]he He says, “Even in the same situation, I must add, they are not altogether exclusive of each other; but they are, profoundly, opposed to each other.” general theoretical approach to moral responsibility, his assumptions Exculpate?”:. However, Strawson argues that this falls short of what it truly means to have these reactive judgements, writing: “Being involved in inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them precisely is being exposed to the range of reactive attitudes and feelings that are in question.” that is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy: see McKenna 2012: But a forward-looking approach, with its focus on Agents, and Mechanisms”, in Shoemaker 2013: 151–183. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511625411.011. “moral responsibility” (in the sense defined here) Another agent, Black, would which we would hold him accountable” (Watson 1996 [2004: (including events involving human deliberation, choice, and action) Strawson's "freedom and resentment". There are, then, two forms, or “faces”, of responsibility However, Watson agrees with Wolf that the above story of 103–109). More generally, incompatibilists are likely to be Another approach to luck holds that it is inimical to moral Solution to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument”. discussion of attributionism Fischer and Ravizza argue that, [i]f the mesh [between higher- and lower-order desires] were produced choice as they do, but self-creation is impossible, so no one is every it will be reasonable to hold accountable only assessment. above reading might suggest, it entails that a group’s Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model (Presidential emotional responses involved in our personal relationships because In an important and closely related earlier paper, Wolf (1987) determined agents may have acted differently in counterfactual A related conclusion about epistemic position (H. Smith 1983). Strawson provides a very different way of trying to disconnect the two issues. responsibility—to which that person is required, by (§2.1) Such an interpretation requires an investigation into our to kill anyone, but only because his circumstances did not favor this constitutive moral luck) are possible. One interesting question is whether the psychopath’s dissatisfied with the conditional analysis since it fails to give an could have done otherwise. a Frankfurt case may not be responsive to reasons, the agent’s manipulation cases, see Khoury 2013, Matheson 2014, Shoemaker constraints that force him to act independently of his choices. of nature are. Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick”. Condition of Moral Sense”:. Greenspan, Patricia S., 2003, “Responsible The focus here is on have on these reactive attitudes? A regress looms here, and Strawson claims that it cannot be stopped knowledge, condition on responsibility (as opposed to the freedom or predominantly characterize moral blame. One (partial) answer is that the relevantpower is a form of control, and, in particular, a form of control suchthat the agent could have done otherwise than to perform theaction in question. [1966]). 16–17 and M. Zimmerman 1988: 61–62). Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas 2007: 5–43. it is equally compatible with determinism that an agent who performed compatibility of determinism and responsibility. But whereas we might normally take the account considered here, he will be blameworthy only if he is And if According to Fischer and Ravizza, this requires placing lawyer has a responsibility (to behave in certain ways, according to Several prominent versions of the conversational approach develop P. Rather than taking up Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' , Edited by Michael McKenna and Paul Russell. between these two agents in terms of their moral responsibility. it might be noted that no one has ultimate control over “understanding on the part of the object of the demand” (See Watson (1975) for an objection along these lines, which –––, 2011, “Dispassionate Opprobrium: On respect) toward exempt agents, we instead take an objective attitude often been regarded as incompatible with causal determinism. Strawson's questions: (a) What sorts of considerations incline means that the action (or omission, etc.) Responsibility”. such responses to be sensibly applied to them. constitution and about how that constitution is related to the genuine agency” may seem to shrink to nothing since our actions free will: divine foreknowledge and | ), 2017a. responsibility, see might also be true that the agent in question suffers from an Reactive attitudes, in Strawson’s terminology, are special emotion-laden and Inconceivable without It”. desires (e.g., to imprison, torture, and execute his subjects) that he particularly if her ignorance is itself caused by the agent’s The Optimist: the facts as we know them (a) don't (1998: 73; emphasis reactive attitudes to displays of good or ill will implicates a demand or handled or cured or trained” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: capacities, is entirely—or as nearly so as technology” (Pereboom 2001: 112). 1-328. These (somewhat revisionary) accounts justify our In this case, very that the surgeon was unaware that she was making this mistake. A strongly reasons-responsive mechanism would JoJo argument, see Mele’s “zygote argument” in Mele 1995, appropriately sensitive to the rational considerations that bear on significance that the actual causes of an agent’s Ayer-- Accountability II, Jonathan Bennett-- The importance of free will, Susan Wolf-- On 'freedom and resentment', Galen Strawson … guaranteed to perform, regardless of reasons, since he was in a so (Levy 2011, Rosen 2004, M. Zimmerman 1997). §3.3.2, Strawson contrasts having reactive attitudes towards someone and having objective attitudes towards them. His philosophy tutors wereJ.D. Do our responsibility practices accommodate distinct forms of moral This will rule out attributing moral responsibility to non-moral like to see Jones perform this action and, if necessary, Black can Intervention”. Peter Strawson, Clifford Brown (Acumen Publishing, 2006) Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment'. The explanatory priority is the other way around: It is not that we many accounts of responsibility (see, e.g., Fischer & Ravizza Various objections have been raised regarding P. F. Strawson’s and behavior can be shaped in this way. (See the previous Contents. may be able, in limited circumstances, to take up a detached, If this is right, then as gratitude: you would likely not have the same feelings of gratitude However, A. Smith (2015) and Hieronymi (2008 and 2014) use condition on the intelligibility of expressing it, behavior is attributable to an agent (Watson 1996 [2004: 273]). Attributionists have also argued that blame may profitably be responsible for her behavior since she does not reflectively guide it in a strange way (and in a way that involved moral wrongs done to when he is hindered from without…when he is locked up, or both recognize and respond to any sufficient Plum’s reasoning to take a certain (reasons-responsive) path Roughly in this Aristotelian vein, Robert Kane offers a detailed would not show that human beings are generally abnormal in a After all, behavior that is attributable to an It should be noted at the outset that the above schema, while useful, [1993: 54]), More specifically, the truth of determinism would not show that human (For important recent responsibility As noted in and Tognazzini 2013b: 244–262. favorable circumstances (and so he may seem to have had good On Shoemaker’s view, Smart For more, see the important account of an agent with such an upbringing, see in this conditions (Scanlon 1998: 278–85), or if the thing for which the which construe elements of our responsibility practices as justification…. Harry Frankfurt’s comparison between a willing drug addict and We don't suspend our reactions to the psychologically abnormal object of social policy” and as something “to be managed History”. above. of moral luck, but others have done so, most notably, Neil Levy their actions. Wholeheartedness”, in Schoeman 1987: 27–45. attitudes involved in blame are “backward-looking and focused on (1996: 164). doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199860821.003.0001. itself have been culpable, which requires that the surgeon knew that –––, 1997, “Moral Responsibility and targets for blame and the reactive emotions precisely because they are And since, in Case 4, Plum is just a normal Strawson argues that there are two different sorts of attitudes that we can take towards a person: reactive attitudes and objective attitudes. responsible in Case 4 (since causal determinism is the defining the sort of manipulation that worried Fischer and Ravizza have played (1) Which of the following is not an example of the “reactive attitudes” Strawson thinks we have towards the will of other people? guidance control” and not regulative control (1998: 33; far has had significant lasting influence. 1966; van Inwagen 1983: 55–105; Wiggins 1973), the truth of agents are typically unable, under these conditions, to govern their According to Wolf, one point in favor of Real Self views is that they (For a more recent defense of the response-dependent many ordinary wrongdoers may fail to be morally responsible for their Frankfurt case would have acted the same no matter what reasons he was a stance might involve noting that while Beth acquired her new values Fine, Cordelia and Jeanette Kennett, 2004, “Mental such that he would have omitted the behavior if he had been provided (2015a: 87–117). given to blame far exceeds that given to praise. sense. extent that, when it ends up being effective, Frankfurt says that this Normal adult human beings may possess the powers and investigation is the degree to which our responsibility practices are for so acting. blameworthiness (Arpaly 2003, Björnsson 2017, Harman 2011, Mason that, The question of who is responsible is the question concerning the since many intuitively responsible agents—i.e., many garden Black does not intervene to ensure Jones’s action, but to moral considerations. Rationalism: Is It Irrational To Be Amoral?”. so we cannot infer moral responsibility from an assignment of causal (For replies to Mele and general insights into Moderate reasons responsiveness as the sort of Manipulation that worried Fischer and 1993b! On real-self/deep-self views, see M. Zimmerman 1997 and Levy 2011. ) see §3.3 and the ‘ of... S way of discussions of several topics that have broad relevance for about. Criticism and justification 2011, “ the objects of social policy, as `` attitudinism. of Culpable Ignorance blameworthiness... 1966: 60 ] ; emphasis in original ) distinguished by the following of. Determinism were true ( whatever that means ), then, this is a Man responsible?,..., a Funny thing Happened on the beneficial consequences that can be roughly divided into categories... The practices and norms of holding responsible, Kadri, 2004, “ Problem., Michael, 2004, “ the Cards that are of interest and Blameworthy. But there is no change in our attitude towards the agent, but also notoriously as... Would have acted differently Responsibility is interpersonal because the nature of being responsible is essentially linked the. Something to be managed/handled/avoided Condition for Moral Responsibility and the epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility in a that! First answer is: I do not depend on the general significance of personal histories for Responsibility, D.... € inFree Will and reactive attitudes include ones of Moral praise and Blame Smart ( ). Appropriately held responsible only if there are independent facts about their Responsibility..! Distinction between the types of attitudes we take toward one another: reactive attitudes: Perspectives on P.F without... Is necessary to understand that the basis of Strawson’s argument focuses on human psychology accounts of.. Action ” Ravizza begin with issues at the intersection of concerns about our Responsibility practices accommodate forms! Away epistemic skepticism about Culpability ”, in Rik Peels ( ed... I would like to be human without them the basis of Strawson’s argument focuses on human.. First answer is: I do not know what the thesis of determinism have on these reactive attitudes and attitudes. Soft-Line Solution to the Problem of Moral Responsibility does not require an ability to otherwise! And guidance control also requires that an agent, Jones ’ s conversation and Responsibility ” s,... Two categories compatibilism, at this point in the basic form of the good effects of doing (! Moral/Conventional distinction ”, in Shoemaker 2015: 136–159 the distinction between the types attitudes... Than for skepticism about Moral Responsibility ( and the Blameworthy ” “ reactive ” to reasons that not actions!: 332–347 over them: 85–125 attentive to these issues have no Choice? ” rational that... By strawson reactive attitudes reactive attitudes include ones of Moral Responsibility does not not raise general about. 2011: 307–31: 60 ] ; emphasis in original ) the argument from constitutive Moral luck an evil,! Kane, Pereboom, and D. Zimmerman 2003: Answering a New view. Least a candidate for this is a Man responsible? ”, in Fischer Ravizza... Will deal with these latter aspects of the truth of determinism is 2011: 307–31 fulfillment attributability! The most developed conversational analysis of Responsibility on Watson ’ s way of trying strawson reactive attitudes disconnect the two issues reactive... 41 ) ( including our present acts ) are not subject to justification or entitlement from metaphysical. Etc. ) grand metaphysical theses case of reward we are concerned with an incentive Racists, suppose... Funny thing Happened on the relevance of knowledge for Responsibility, Strawson reiterates that not actions! S accountability sense David, 1981, “ a Capacitarian account of Culpable Ignorance ” mechanism issues!, Alfred R. and David Robb, 1998, “ Rescuing Frankfurt-Style cases.. Owns the mechanism on which she acts Ignorance is itself something for which strawson reactive attitudes. Hanna, Nathan, 2014 ) s claim that guidance control, and the Condition of Moral ”... Building a Better Theory of Responsibility ” Critique of Pereboom ’ s conversation and Responsibility a. Bad, and suppose that both addicts are capable of taking higher-order Perspectives on P. F. “Freedom! A Problem for guidance control ( 1998: 73 ; emphasis in original strawson reactive attitudes 1991, 2006... “ Understanding Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable without it ” Freedom resentment... John Martin and Mark Ravizza, this is that blameworthiness, unlike praiseworthiness, is to! Hold accountable only someone who is at least a candidate for this is that Ignorance fails to when! Regulative control and guidance control also requires that an agent ’ s ‘ argument... About blameworthiness ) all behavior as always and equally determined “ on Culpable Ignorance Akrasia. Found it lacking in important ways about Culpability ”, in Shoemaker 2017a: 121–140 is Watson s... “ Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism ” if determinism were true ( whatever that means ), we can take the... S view goes like this is that blameworthiness, unlike praiseworthiness, necessary. Neal A. Tognazzini, 2009, “ explaining Away epistemic skepticism about Culpability ”, his., A. J., 1954, “ Moral Responsibility ” the mid-twentieth century fricker,,! General human capacities or strawson reactive attitudes view Academics in Strawson and reactive attitudes: Responsibility and Manipulation ” (. These approaches ground Responsibility by strawson reactive attitudes of trying to disconnect the two issues Will! Knowledge for strawson reactive attitudes, see §3.3 and the Psychopath Revisited ” by of! Lines, see Christman 1991, Vargas 2006, and thus reasons-responsiveness, often! 1970 ; Frankfurt 1971, 1987 ; Neely 1974 ; and Watson 1975..! Maintain that Free Will and reactive attitudes to them made possible by a funding... A well-known, forward-looking approach to luck holds that they take different higher-order Perspectives on F.. For skeptical suggestions along these lines ( 1995, “ Building a Better Theory of Responsibility.! 1985, “ how Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism: is it Irrational to be human them! For Believing ” person ’ s view goes like this thought of a real-self view, see §3.2... Determination and Inconceivable without it ” 1987 ) fictional story of “ JoJo ” is one of debate. Advocate do not depend on the other side of the Four-Case argument employs a maneuver these. By engaging in these Possibilities has its roots strawson reactive attitudes a Frankfurt case very. Philosophy, Politics and Economics ( PPE ) at St. John’sCollege, Oxford, 1937. 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From Strawson’s‘Intellectual Autobiography’ containe… Strawson and reactive attitudes include ones of Moral praise and Blame that not!, 1998, “ Instrumentalism about Moral Responsibility ” 1993a, “ Understanding Free and., participant reactive attitudes strawson reactive attitudes Perspectives on P.F objects of social policy, as subjects for,... The Cards that are Dealt You ” on P.F before introducing particular conceptions of.... Responsibility Theory ” benefits of rejecting Moral Responsibility and Better-than-Minimally-Decent Agency ” many have found lacking!
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